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Abstract 
The effects of IT on the decision making structure of firms has been a topic of debate for decades. On 
the one hand, IT increases the information available to top management, and the coordination 
advantages that it provides may lead firms to centralize decision making. On the other hand, IT makes it 
possible to disseminate global information of the firm to line workers enabling them to make better 
decisions as well as enhances management’s monitoring capability, favoring decentralization. In order to 
understand the economy wide effects of centralization and decentralization of decision rights on the 
productivity effect of IT, we conduct an empirical analysis to examine the change in the effects of IT 
performance in firms that changed its decision making structure, using a panel data set for 2,300 
Japanese firms over 4 years. Our results indicate that both centralization and decentralization have a 
substantial productivity effect on IT for firms that changed its decision making structure and the 
productivity effects are more marked for firms that conducted radical change of decision rights. Moreover, 
we find evidence that changes in decision rights have a more pronounced productivity effect on large 
firms. Finally, our results show that productivity effects due to changes in decision rights are realized only 
in the non-manufacturing sectors. This paper sheds some light on the effects of decision rights on firms’ 
IT performance and underscores the importance of organizational redesign accompanying IT 
investment.  
1
RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of professional 
papers, thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are solely those of the 
author(s), and do not present those of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. 1. Introduction 
  In the past decade, due to the swift technological progress of Information 
Technology (IT) coupled with its rapidly declining prices, IT has diffused broadly into 
many sectors of the economy. Several empirical studies report that IT has a positive 
impact on productivity of U.S. firms (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996, Lichtenburg 1995). 
Similarly in Japan, the contribution of IT has been recognized to be substantial at the 
firm-level (Motohashi 2006).   
  However, in order to fully reap the benefits of IT, several studies have stressed 
the importance of complementary workplace reorganization accompanying the adoption 
of IT. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) point out that a key value of IT is its ability to enable 
complementary organizational investments such as business processes and work 
practices, which in turn increases productivity. Breshanan et al (2002) find empirical 
evidence of complementarities between IT and workplace organization, and report that 
the type of workplace organization complementary with IT is one with a decentralized 
decision making structure. Several case studies similarly report changes in work 
practices accompanying IT deployment (Hunter et al. 2000, Brynjolfsson et al. 1997).   
  Several empirical studies have investigated the joint effects of both workplace 
reorganization and IT on productivity. Black and Lynch (2001) examine the effects of 
different types of work practices, IT, and educational level of employees on labor 
productivity, and find that workplace practices positively affects productivity. 
Bresnahan et al (2002) report that firms that combine IT, workplace reorganization, and 
more skilled workers increases productivity. Bertschek and Kaiser(2004) examine the 
effects of complementarities between the various inputs including IT and workplace 
reorganization, and find that enhancement of group work and flattening of hierarchies 
increases labor productivity. 
  Although past studies provide some support for decentralizing decision rights 
accompanying IT investment, there is still a lack of quantitative studies compared with 
the plethora of case studies accentuating the importance of decentralizing decision 
rights to reap the benefits of IT. Moreover, since there is little quantitative evidence on 
the effects of centralization on IT performance, the productivity effects of centralization 
is unclear1.  
  This paper attempts to fill this gap by providing quantitative evidence on the 
                                                  
1  The study by the Economic Research Institute, Economic Planning Agency (2004) has 
shown that there is a positive correlation between the degree of using IT and 
performing of organizational reform, including centralization and decentralization of 
decision rights. 
2effects of reallocating decision rights on IT performance. Unlike past studies that have 
focused on the effects of “workplace reorganization”, we examine the productivity effects 
of IT due to changing decision rights. Thus, we do not address issues such as the 
restructuring of organizational form (e.g. flattening of hierarchies), and instead focus on 
the change in decision rights, given an organizational structure (which is typically some 
form of hierarchy).   
  An important point to note is that our study focuses on Japanese firms. The 
decision making structure of a typical American and Japanese firm are different (Aoki 
1986), so implications from past studies may not directly apply to Japanese firms, and 
the results of this study may not apply directly to Western firms. Since the decision 
making structure of Japanese firms has been more decentralized than Western 
counterparts, it is interesting to find whether the acclaimed effects of decentralization 
from past studies also has a positive productivity effect in Japan. Furthermore, since 
the decision making structure had been more decentralized, it may be the case in Japan 
that centralization is the solution to reap the benefits of IT.   
  Using panel data of 2,300 Japanese firms spanning 4 years, we examine the 
change in the productivity effects of IT in firms that centralized or decentralized its 
decision making structure, controlling for firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, our 
regression is conducted taking the degree of the change in decision rights into account, 
which reveals the differences in firm performance of firms that went through a radical 
change and those that experienced only minor changes. In order to find the type of 
change in decision rights that increases productivity for different types of firms, we 
grouped our sample by firm size and industrial classification. 
  Our major finding is that both centralization and decentralization of decision 
rights increases the productivity effects o f  I T .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w e  f i n d  t h a t  b i g g e r  
productivity effects are realized by firms that implemented a radical change in decision 
rights compared with firms that performed minor changes. In the sample grouped by 
firm size, we find some evidence that increases in the productivity effects of IT due to 
reallocation of decision rights are realized by large firms. Finally, in the sample grouped 
by industrial classification, we find that the impact of reallocating decision rights is 
heterogeneous among different sectors, and that positive productivity effects are 
realized only by firms in the non-manufacturing sectors.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
framework, Section 3 shows the empirical model, Section 4 explains the data used in the 
regression, Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
32. Framework 
2.1 The Relationship Between IT and Decision Rights 
  The debate about whether IT would lead to centralization or decentralization of 
decision making stems back to 1958 when Leavitt and Whisler predicted, among others, 
that the introduction of IT in firms would lead to centralization of decision making 
(Leavitt and Whisler 1958). Over the years, many studies have attempted to address 
this issue, some pointing out to centralization, some indicating decentralization, while 
others reporting no effects at all2.  
  Hayek (1945) stressed the importance of locating knowledge and decision 
rights together to improve organizational performance. Jensen and Meckling (1992) 
proposed two ways to collocate information and decision rights, which have been 
referred to as the MIS solution and the organizational design solution by Brynjolfsson 
and Mendelson(1993). The MIS solution transfers the information required to the 
decision maker using IT, whereas the organizational design solution moves decision 
rights to where the pertinent information is. The MIS solution is usually associated 
with centralization whereas the organizational design solution usually favors some 
form of decentralization (Nault 1998).   
  Gurbaxani and Whang (1991) presents a framework that explains why IT may 
lead to either centralization or decentralization of decision rights depending on the way 
IT impacts decision related costs that the firms face. On the one hand, IT provides the 
capability to improve the quality and speed of top management’s decision making which 
has an effect of decreasing decision information costs, leading to centralization of 
decision rights. On the other hand, IT improves the monitoring capability of top 
management which reduces agency costs, leading to decentralization. Thus, the choice 
of centralization or decentralization depends on the specific cost structure of the firm. 
 
2.2 IT and Centralization 
  A key reason that IT may lead to centralization is the coordination advantages 
that it provides by increasing the processing capacities of managers or decreasing 
communication costs which equips managers with more information. Leavitt and 
Whisler(1958) stresses the improved information processing capability by managers, 
which ensues in centralization. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) presents a model which 
reveals that the reduction in communicatio n  c o s t s  c a u s e d  b y  I T  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  
centralization due to the increased span of control by top management. Similarly, 
                                                  
2  Refer to George and King(1991) for an overview on this issue. 
4Gurbaxani and Whang(1991) point out that IT improves the quality and speed of top 
management’s decision making process, which may lead to centralization.   
  Several anecdotal evidences report that Japanese firms have used IT to 
centralize decision rights. For example, Aeon, a large retail chain in Japan, introduced a 
real-time online system that enables the central office to access sales data and control 
the inventory. After the implementation of the new system, the head office now sets the 
minimum/maximum inventory and the ordering amount, which was previously decided 
by the person in charge at the local store (Nikkei Computer 2004). The case of Aeon 
clearly depicts how IT has engendered an opportunity to centralize decision rights by 
providing top management pertinent information for decision making.   
  The case of All Nippon Airlines  (ANA) reveals the coordination advantages 
provided by IT. After the introduction of a new information system at ANA, the seat 
allocations which were delegated to each shop are now handled on a first come first 
serve basis, based on the slot optimized by the new system. This reduced the decision 
rights and degree of freedom of the sales division (Nikkei Information Strategy 2005).   
 
2.3 IT and Decentralization 
  Various studies have indicated why it is advantageous for firms to decentralize 
decision rights with the advent of IT. Alleviation of information overload, increased 
sharing of global information at the floor level, and reduction in agency costs are some 
reasons that have been indicated in past studies that supports decentralization of 
decision rights accompanying the deployment of IT.   
  F i r s t ,  a s  I T  g e t s  d e p l o y e d  i n  a  f i rm, the amount of available information 
increases abruptly, leading to a phenomenon of “information overload”(Brynjolfsson and 
Mendelson 1993). Decentralizing decision rights alleviates the burden on top 
management as well as cut unnecessary communication up and down the hierarchy. 
According to Van Zandt(2003)’s model, if IT speeds up the firm’s strategic environment, 
other things being equal, this would lead to smaller and decentralized firms. 
  Second, IT has made it possible to disseminate and access information easily at 
the floor level, and as a consequence, employees can now make decisions using global 
information of the firm as well as their own specific idiosyncratic knowledge that they 
possess on the floor (Malone 1997). Anand and Mendelson (1997) models various 
coordination structures of a firm competing in multiple horizontal markets and shows 
that expected profits are generally the highest for firms with a decentralized decision 
making structure with access to global information. Similarly, Aoki and Okuno (1996) 
provides a model that explains how the introduction of IT affects decision making of 
5different divisions by enabling access to global information of the firm together with 
their division specific knowledge. 
  Third, IT may lead to decentralization is due to a reduction in agency costs. 
Gurbaxani and Whang  (1991) point out that the enhanced monitoring capability 
provided by IT may lead firms to decentralize decision rights. The case of NTT Docomo, 
the largest mobile phone carrier in Japan, exemplifies how IT reduces agency costs. 
When NTT Docomo deployed a new information system “DREAMS”, workers at the 
floor level were given autonomy to change budgets contingent upon the changing 
environment that they face. These changes in expenditure by the divisions are inputted 
to DREAMS which is accessible by top management. CFO Ugaki notes that the 
disclosure of expenditure by each of the divisions by DREAMS prevents questionable 
expenditures by the divisions (Nikkei Information Strategy 2006). 
 
3. Empirical Model 
  We employ a production function approach to estimate the productivity effects 
of IT in firms that changed decision rights. In the baseline case for the whole sample, we 
estimate the following extended Cobb-Douglas production function: 
       i it it it it it DRR IT IT L K VA * ln ln ln ln ln δ γ β α + + + =                               
            it i i i it u t t DRM t DRR DRM IT + + + + + * * * * ln φ η µ ζ     (1) 
where VAit is value-added of firm i at time t, K is capital, IT is IT capital services, DRRi 
is a dummy variable indicating that the firm changed its decision making structure 
radically, DRMi is a dummy variable indicating that the firm made minor changes of its 
decision making structure. Finally, the error term uit consists of the firm specific effect 
ait, shocks that are exogenous to the firm eit, and the error term  it ε : 
 
                                it it it it e a u ε + + =                                ( 2 )  
 
We estimate this equation using the linear fixed effects model, fixing and controlling for 
firm heterogeneity: i.e. ait = ai.  
  In the sample grouped by firm size and industrial classification, we collapse 
radical and minor change in decision rights into one binary variable: 
        it i it it it it it u t t DR DR IT IT L K VA + + + + + + = * * * ln ln ln ln ln φ µ δ γ β α     (3) 
where DRi is the binary variable representing whether the firm centralized or 
decentralized decision rights.   
  VA is calculated, K comes from the book value of capital stock, and L is data 
form the number of labor employees. VA and K are deflated using a 3 digit industry 
6deflator and deflator for investment respectively. The variable for IT is the amount of IT 
capital services which have been computed by deflating IT expenditure by the rental 
price of IT capital3. The regression is estimated over 4 years.   
 
4. Data and Methodology 
  The data related to firm performance has been obtained from the Basic Survey 
on Business Structure and Activity (BSBSA), the Ministry of Economy Trade and 
Industry’s (METI’s) annual enterprise census survey. The BSBSA survey covers all 
firms in manufacturing, wholesale and retrial sector, and some business service sectors 
with more than 50 employees and 30 trillion yen of capital. The data relevant to the 
present study are the amount of tangible fixed capital, number of employees, amount of 
IT expenditure, and value-added which was calculated using double deflation, 
subtracting input from output (sales). Input was obtained by subtracting depreciation, 
wage, and IT expenditure from total cost. Output and input data used to obtain 
value-added are deflated using a 3-digit industry input and output deflator, and capital 
is deflated using a deflator of fixed assets averaged across all industries. 
  The data used in the present study is similar to that of Motohashi(2006), with 
the exception of using the method of double deflation to obtain value-added. Following 
Motohashi(2006), we deflated IT expenditure from the BSBSA by the rental price of IT 
capital services from Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005), to obtain a measure of IT capital 
service flow at the firm level4.  
  Data on firm performance from the BSBSA were linked to data from METI’s 
ICT Workplace survey, which is an annual survey that focuses on the use of IT by firms, 
surveying items such as the amount of IT investments in detailed classification and the 
type of network applications used for different business processes. From the survey in 
2000, the survey sample was constructed using stratified random sampling from the list 
of firms in the BSBSA, making it possible to link detailed ICT data with firm 
performance measures. 
  The survey in 2002 includes a questionnaire on organizational change, asking 
the respondents whether the firm conducted a specific type of organizational change or 
business process reform during 2000-2002. The types of change or reform surveyed 
include flattening of hierarchy, reorganization of divisions, change in trade share, and 
increased outsourcing. The respondents circle one of the following for each type of 
organizational change: 1. Radically proceeded with the change 2. Performed minor 
                                                  
3
  Refer to Section 4 for details. 
 4  Refer to Motohashi(2006) for details. 
7changes 3. Did not change. Respondents that circled 1 or 2 (i.e. firms that performed the 
specific type of organizational change) proceed to the next question that asks the effects 
of the change. The respondents circle one of the following: A. There was an effect B. 
Hard to say whether there was an effect or not C. There was no effect. Among the types 
of organizational change surveyed, the present study focuses on “Centralization of 
Decision Rights” and “Decentralization of Decision Rights”. We used data on firms that 
radically performed change and firms that performed minor changes as the binary 
variables in the production function estimation.   
  Since the survey asks whether the firm performed a certain type of 
organizational change during 2000-2002, we linked this data on organizational change 
from the ICT workplace survey with firm performance measures of the BSBSA from 
2000 to 20035. Although the survey on organizational change ends in 2002, we include 
firm performance measures in 2003, since the effect of organizational change may not 
be instantaneous. After excluding firms that did not answer the ICT Workplace Survey 
question on decision rights and firms that could not be linked to the BSBSA or had 
missing observations in firm performance, we ended up with a balanced panel data set 




  Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics of the whole sample regarding change 
in the decision making structure of firms. Approximately 5% of the firms radically 
centralized decision rights and 9% of the firms performed minor centralization, 
revealing that more firms performed minor modifications in decision rights 
accompanying IT investment. As regards to decentralization, 4% of the firms conducted 




  Table 2 shows the effects of the change in decision rights accompanying IT 
investment by the respondents in our sample. The responses may be interpreted as the 
perceived effects of changing decision rights by the firms. The figures reveal that over 
three quarters of firms that radically changed decision rights perceived an effect. As 
regards to firms that performed minor changes, the perceived effect of the change drops 
                                                  
5  The data on 2003 is the latest one that is currently available. 
8to approximately 40% for both centralization and decentralization of decision rights. 
These qualitative figures indicate that firms that were able to use IT to radically 
centralize or decentralize generally experienced a positive effect, whereas not as many 
firms that performed only minor changes in decision rights perceived such an effect.   
 
5. Results   
  Table 3 shows the results of the whole sample, which is a balanced panel 
spanning 4 years of approximately 2,300 firms6. First, the results report that the 
productivity effects of IT are larger for firms that changed decision rights accompanying 
IT investment. Furthermore, our results indicate that the productivity effects of IT are 
larger for firms that went through radical changes in decision rights compared with 
firms that performed minor changes, which is consistent with firms’ perceived effects 
displayed in Table 2.   
  The results of the regression for firms that performed centralization indicate 
that the output elasticity of IT increases 8.2% for firms that radically centralized and 
4.5% for firms that performed minor centralization. Furthermore, our results show that 
firms that radically centralized decision rights also increased total factor productivity 
(TFP) by 1.8%. With respect to the regression for firms that performed decentralization, 
the results report that the output elasticity of IT increases by 13.6% for firms that 
radically changed decision rights. The coefficient of the IT term interacted with minor 





  The result of decentralization of decision rights increasing the productivity 
effects of IT is consistent with Bresnahan et al. (2002). As IT enables the floor level to 
access global information of the firm or reduces agency costs by enhancing the 
monitoring capability of top management, decisions that are more aligned with the 
firm’s strategic goals could be made at the floor level, which may be reflected as an 
increase in the elasticity of IT capital services. The result of centralization increasing 
the productivity effects of IT may be indicating the coordination advantages that IT 
provides by enhancing top management’s decision making process. In both cases, the 
productivity effects of IT are larger for radical changes compared with minor changes, 
                                                  
6  The number of firms in the centralization and decentralization sample differs slightly, 
since 2 more firms answered the survey question on decentralization.   
9indicating that firms that were able to use IT to radically change decision making 




  Table 4 shows the results of the regression grouped by firm size. The sample 
was separated into two groups, divided by the median size of the firm in the mid-point 
of the sample7. In the sample separated into groups, both radical and minor changes 
were collapsed into one binary variable of whether the firm changed decision rights or 
not. The results of Table 4 reveal that the productivity effects of IT due to both 
centralization and decentralization is large and statistically significant for large firms, 
whereas the same effects are small and statistically insignificant in SME’s. Thus, our 
results indicate that increases in the productivity effects of IT due to reallocating 
decision rights are realized only by large firms.   
  Since large firms intrinsically possess an intricate organizational architecture 
compared with SME’s, it may be natural that the new advantages of reallocating 
decision rights enabled by IT has a larger effect in large firms. The coordination 
advantages enabled by IT are larger for large firms, simply because coordination costs 
increase with firm size. Thus the benefits of reducing coordination costs via 
centralization are larger for large firms. Similarly, as firm size increases, agency costs 
rise, the information overload problem becomes more severe, and the benefits of 
information sharing by line workers increase. Therefore, the benefits of IT in 
decentralizing decision rights are larger for large firms. Since these benefits of 





  Table 5 shows the results grouped by industrial classification. The whole 
sample was separated into manufacturing, wholesale/retail trade, and others. The 
sample of “others” consists mainly of the service sector (84%). The results indicate that 
productivity effects due to changing decision rights are realized only in the 
non-manufacturing sector. First, the results from the manufacturing sector report that 
                                                  
7  The mid-point was chosen to be 2002, which is the year of the data on organizational 
change. The median number of employees is 277, and the number of firms in each group 
is approximately 1,170 firms. 
10both centralization and decentralization of decision rights does not affect the output 
elasticity of IT. Second, the results from the wholesale/retail sample reveal that only 
decentralization of decision rights increases the productivity effects of IT in wholesale 
and retail trade. Finally, in the service sector, the productivity effects of IT increase for 
both centralization and decentralization, and the increase is especially pronounced for 
centralization of decision rights.     
  Brynjolfsson et al.(1997)’s case study of a producer of medical products 
underscores the importance of complementary changes in organizational structure, 
including changes in decision rights, accompanying investment in computer integrated 
manufacturing in a factory to increase firm performance. However, our results indicate 
that changing decision rights does not change the productivity effects of IT in 
manufacturing firms. One speculation is that the decision making structure of Japanese 
manufacturing firms has always been one of its great strengths, and further changes in 
decision rights accompanying IT investment does not impact productivity.   
 Malone  (1997) accentuates the importance of decentralizing decision rights, 
focusing on the revolution in retailing. In modern retail stores, such as at Wal-Mart, IT 
is used to enable local managers have access to global information of the firm (e.g. 
national sales data), that helps them make their decisions, together with the local 
idiosyncratic specific knowledge that they possess. The results indicating positive 
productivity effects by firms conducting decentralization of decision rights in the 
wholesale/retail sector may be reflecting these effects.   
  The sample of firms in the service sector consists of a wide variety of firms in 
disparate areas, ranging from finance to construction. One interpretation of the effects 
of both centralization and decentralization impacting productivity is that the effects 
reflect the disparate ways IT is used in different sectors, but indicates a positive effect 
overall in both directions of change in decision rights.   
  One important finding is that the productivity effects of changing decision 
rights are only realized in the non-manufacturing sectors. In manufacturing sectors, a 
production facility is also an important physical capital input. In this regards, the 
importance of IT capital stock to production process is relatively larger for 
non-manufacturing firms. In addition, IT plays a key role in business innovation in 
services sectors (Motohashi, 2001). Therefore, effectiveness in IT use in these sectors 
may have clearer effect on productivity performance, as compared to manufacturing 
sectors.   
 
6. Conclusion 
11  This paper examined the impact of centralization and decentralization of 
decision rights on the productivity effects of IT. Using panel data for 2,300 Japanese 
firms, the increase in the partial elasticity of IT due to changes in decision rights was 
estimated, and the results indicate that both centralization and decentralization of 
decision substantially increases the productivity effects of IT. Moreover, we find that 
larger gains in productivity are realized by firms that went through a radical change in 
decision rights.   
  Our sample grouped by firm size gives broad evidence that the productivity 
effects of IT due to reallocating decision rights is larger for large firms compared with 
SME’s. The disparity in the IT coefficients between large and small firms may reflect 
the substantial advantages that large firms have gained by increased coordination or 
enhanced decision making of workers. In the sample grouped by industry, the results 
report that there are no productivity effects of IT due to reallocation of decision rights in 
the manufacturing sector, whereas productivity gains are realized by firms that 
performed decentralization in the wholesale/retail sector and firms that conducted 
centralization or decentralization in the service sector, indicating that changes in 
decision rights impacts the productivity effects heterogeneously in different sectors.   
    Our results that decentralization of decision rights affecting the productivity of 
IT is consistent with past findings by Bresnahan et al (2002), although their measure of 
decentralization includes several indicators of decentralization, whereas we focus on the 
effects of decentralizing decision rights on IT performance. Our study is one of the first 
studies that empirically revealed the positive effects of centralizing decision rights on IT 
performance of firms, which provides managers statistical evidence that using IT to 
centralize decision rights increases productivity, consistent with anecdotal evidences. 
Taken together, the results of this study underscore the importance of using IT to 
reallocate decision rights whenever possible in order to fully reap the benefits of IT.   
  An extension to our study is to examine the micro mechanism of the effects of 
changing decision rights, especially centralization on IT performance, through a 
detailed case study since the exact nature of the change in decision rights accompanying 
the adoption of IT is likely to be highly firm and situation specific. Another interesting 
research agenda is to investigate the effects of centralization of decision rights on the 
productivity effects of IT in U.S. firms and conduct an international comparison to find 
if there are any differences in the results due to inherent differences in the decision 
making structure of these two countries.   
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14Table 1: Percentage Share of Firms that Changed Decision Rights 
Firm Share(%) Number of firms
Centralization -Radical 4.78 112
-Minor 8.67 203
Decentralization -Radical 4.10 96
-Minor 11.39 267  
 
Table 2: Effects of Change in Decision Rights（% share of firms) 
Yes Hard to Say No
Centralization -Radical 77 23 0
-Minor 41 57 2
Decentralization -Radical 76 24 0
-Minor 41 58 1  
 
Table 3: Productivity Effects in the Whole Sample 
Centralization Decentralizaiton
coefficent std. t coefficent std. t
α(Capital Elasticity) 0.064*** 0.011 5.66 0.066*** 0.011 5.78
β(Labor Elasticity) 0.445*** 0.022 19.85 0.449*** 0.022 20.06
γ(IT Elasticity) 0.071*** 0.007 9.81 0.072*** 0.007 9.86
δ(Radical Change*ln IT) 0.082*** 0.029 2.84 0.136*** 0.030 4.51
ζ(Minor Change*ln IT) 0.045** 0.023 1.98 0.024 0.020 1.18
μ(Radical Change*year) 0.018* 0.011 1.65 0.005 0.011 0.46
ν(Minor Change*year) -0.012 0.008 -1.43 -0.003 0.007 -0.45
φ(year) 0.038*** 0.002 15.25 0.038*** 0.003 15.15
Number of Firms 2342 2344
Number of Observations 9368 9376  
Key: ***- p<0.01, **- p<0.05, *- p<0.1.   
 
Table 4: Productivity Effects Grouped by Firm Size   
Large Firms SME's
Centralization Decentralizaiton Centralization Decentralizaiton
coefficent std. coefficent std. coefficent std. coefficent std.
α(Capital Elasticity 0.070*** 0.018 0.070*** 0.018 0.063*** 0.014 0.066*** 0.015
β(Labor Elasticity) 0.435*** 0.029 0.443*** 0.029 0.450*** 0.035 0.448*** 0.035
γ(IT Elasticity) 0.058*** 0.010 0.062*** 0.010 0.083*** 0.010 0.085*** 0.010
δ(Change*ln IT) 0.082*** 0.022 0.079*** 0.022 0.032 0.033 0.021 0.021
μ(Change*year) -0.002 0.008 0.002 0.008 -0.013 0.011 -0.011 -0.011
φ(year) 0.053*** 0.003 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.024*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.004
No. of Firms 1171 1171 1171 1173
No. of Observations 4684 4684 4684 4692
Key: ***- p<0.01, **- p<0.05, *- p<0.1.   
15Table 5: Productivity Effects Grouped by Industry 
Manufacturing Wholesale and Retail Trade
Centralization Decentralizaiton Centralization Decentralizaiton
coefficent std. coefficent std. coefficent std. coefficent std.
α(Capital Elasticity -0.008 0.027 -0.008 0.027 0.039*** 0.018 0.040*** 0.018
β(Labor Elasticity) 0.612*** 0.038 0.614*** 0.038 0.331*** 0.032 0.333*** 0.031
γ(IT Elasticity) 0.068*** 0.011 0.067*** 0.011 0.084*** 0.013 0.073*** 0.012
δ(Change*ln IT) -0.009 0.035 -0.002 0.033 0.023 0.030 0.136*** 0.034
μ(Change*year) 0.003 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.009
φ(year) 0.027*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.004 0.089*** 0.004 0.089*** 0.004
No. of Firms 1048 1050 835 835




coefficent std. coefficent std.
α(Capital Elasticity 0.086*** 0.015 0.091*** 0.016
β(Labor Elasticity) 0.420*** 0.048 0.428*** 0.048
γ(IT Elasticity) 0.079*** 0.013 0.092*** 0.013
δ(Change*ln IT) 0.128*** 0.030 0.062** 0.025
μ(Change*year) -0.012 0.013 0.010 0.012
φ(year) -0.022*** 0.005 -0.026*** 0.006
No. of Firms 459 459
No. of Observations 1836 1836  
Key: ***- p<0.01, **- p<0.05, *- p<0.1.   
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